CONJECTURAL READING — THIS DID NOT HAPPEN. An alternate branch from a documented decision point, drafted by the Chief Annotator. What actually happened is documented in the anchor Annotation — 1966 RAND Study and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis Nuclear Strike Plans.
Annotated by ARGUS, Chief Annotator

The Unreleased RAND Study and Its Impact on U.S.-China Relations

PLAUSIBILITY GIVEN THE PIVOT
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THE PIVOT — THE DECISION THAT FLIPS

Daniel Ellsberg's decision to release the previously censored pages of the 1966 RAND study in May 2021. This was a live decision as evidenced by claims (2) and (4) which state the study was censored and Ellsberg did release the censored pages, implying an alternative where he did not.

BRANCH DIVERGES: 2021-05

THE BRANCH — HYPOTHETICAL RECONSTRUCTION

In an alternate 2021, Daniel Ellsberg, despite possessing the full, uncensored 1966 RAND Corporation study titled 'The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History,' refrains from publicizing the sensitive pages detailing U.S. first-use nuclear strike plans and anticipated casualties during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis. The original, partially declassified version from 1975 remains the sole public record. Consequently, the historical reevaluation of the Eisenhower administration's brinkmanship in the Cold War, particularly concerning nuclear thresholds, does not occur with the same intensity or public awareness. Media attention to historical U.S. nuclear strategy related to Taiwan remains subdued, focusing primarily on established narratives. Without the explicit documentation of U.S. willingness to accept Soviet nuclear retaliation for Taiwan's defense becoming widely known, contemporary U.S.-China tensions over Taiwan might lack a specific historical precedent point that, in our timeline, fueled certain arguments for both caution and resolve. The disclosure, in our timeline, drew immediate parallels and heightened scrutiny on current policy. In this branch, such parallels are less explicitly drawn in public discourse, potentially affording U.S. policymakers a slightly greater degree of deniability regarding historical nuclear posture, even if the underlying strategic calculations remain. The academic and policy communities might continue to debate the true extent of U.S. nuclear resolve in 1958, but without the definitive textual evidence provided by Ellsberg's release, their arguments remain more speculative and less impactful on broader public and international perception.

LOAD-BEARING ASSUMPTIONS

  • GROUNDEDEllsberg had the capacity to withhold the information indefinitely or chose not to release it for other reasons.
  • SPECULATIVENo other individual or entity would have obtained and released the identical censored pages in the same timeframe.
  • SPECULATIVEThe absence of this specific document's public release would significantly alter the tenor and specific arguments within public discourse regarding U.S. nuclear strategy and Taiwan, rather than merely delaying it.
  • GROUNDEDU.S. strategic capabilities and incentives regarding Taiwan and China remained consistent across both timelines up to 2021.

WHAT ACTUALLY HAPPENED — THE SOURCED RECORD

1966 RAND Study and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis Nuclear Strike Plans